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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the span of nearly a century and a half, the federal 
government granted control of millions of acres of federal land to newly 
formed states upon each state entering the Union.1  The terms of these 
land grants changed over the course of time, but the underlying purpose 
of the grants remained relatively uniform: to support public education.2  
These state lands, known as school or state trust lands, are publicly 
owned and managed but are not typical public lands in the most 
commonly used sense of the term.3  Rather, state school trust lands are 
their own breed of public lands.  Knowledge of Montana’s unique state 
school trust land history is essential to understanding current 
management of these important public lands.  
This article presents a synopsis of the history and legal principles 
of Montana’s school trust lands.  Part II discusses the origin of the 
federal land grant program, including the variation in the amount of lands 
granted and the grant recipients.  Part II also discusses how the federal 
land grants came to be viewed as imposing a trust relationship between 
the receiver of the grants and the grant’s intended beneficiaries.  Part III 
discusses the unique history of Montana’s school trust lands, including 
Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act, Constitution, and statutory scheme 
relating to trust lands.  Part III further discusses the administration of 
school trust lands in Montana and the current status of these lands, with a 
brief description of the current market conditions leading to an increase 
in commercial development of state trust lands.  Part IV focuses on case 
law relating to Montana’s school trust lands, including how early courts 
                                                 
* Jessica Wiles is a Special Assistant Attorney General for the State 
of Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation.  J.D. 2010, Lewis 
and Clark Law School; B.S. 2001 University of Montana.  The opinions contained 
herein are solely those of the author and do not represent that of any agency or 
organization.  
1. In total, Congress gave the states 77,630,000 acres for common 
schools, and 21,700,000 to the states for universities, hospitals, asylums, and other 
public institutions.  See CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE ORIGINAL 
FEDERAL LAND GRANT PROGRAM: A BACKGROUND PAPER FROM THE CENTER ON 
EDUCATION POLICY 15 (2001) [hereinafter CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY BACKGROUND 
PAPER]. 
2.  In re Powder River Drainage Area, 702 P.2d 948, 952 (Mont. 1985) 
(“A major policy of the fledgling nation was to foster public education by grants of 
land to newly admitted states for that purpose.  Each of the thirty states carved out of 
the public domain received such grants, varying in the quantity granted, and terms of 
the grant, as national policy and political winds dictated.”). 
3.  JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: 
HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE USE 285 (1996). 
WILES  PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/24/2017 8:03 PM 
 
 
2017 MONTANA’S STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS 151 
 
 
affirmed the trust relationship, and how case law created through 
taxpayer, citizen group, and environmental group challenges has led to 
the core legal principles surrounding Montana’s school trust lands. 
Finally, Part IV concludes that the management of school trust lands, as 
well as the income derived from such lands is, and will remain, 
immensely important to Montana.   
 
II.  THE ORIGIN OF STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS 
 
Using federal land grants to support public education and public 
schools is not a modern concept.4  As history reflects, our nation’s 
founders used federal land grants as a way to incorporate the principles 
of democracy into the far flung regions of the nation.5  In doing so, this 
policy equipped individual citizens with resources to exercise the rights 
and responsibilities of a democratic society.6  This policy was first 
revealed in the General Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787.7  The federal land grants changed over time in terms 
of both the amount of lands granted and the entities to which the lands 
were granted.8  Ultimately, without an express intention within the grants 
themselves, these grants came to be viewed as bestowing a trust 
responsibility on the recipient.9  This Part does not fully detail that 
history, but rather attempts to summarize the origin of the federal land 




                                                 
4.  GARETH C. MOON, THE HISTORY OF MONTANA STATE FORESTRY: A 
COMPROMISE BETWEEN IDEALISM AND ECONOMIC PRACTICALITY 9 (1991); see also 
PETER W. CULP, DIANE B. CONRADI & CYNTIA C. TUELL, TRUST LANDS IN THE 
AMERICAN WEST:  A LEGAL OVERVIEW AND POLICY ASSESSMENT, A POLICY 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY & SONORAN 
INSTITUTE JOINT VENTURE ON STATE TRUST LANDS 4–6 (2005).  
5.  CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 4.  
6.  CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 1, at 2; see 
also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 4–5 (“This theme was adopted with 
great fervor by the American revolutionaries, who believed that a well-educated 
citizenry would be essential to protect liberty and ensure that the citizens of the 
Republic would be prepared to exercise the basic freedoms of religion, press, 
assembly, due process of law, and trial by jury.”).  
7.  CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 2. 
8.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 18–33. 
9.  Id. at 33–36. 
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A. Origins of Federal Land Grants for Purposes of Supporting Public 
Schools 
Two early federal statutes established key federal land 
disposition policies and began the large scale systematization of land 
grants for purposes of supporting public educational institutions.10  The 
first, the General Land Ordinance of 1785, established the rectangular 
survey and sale of western land.11  The survey provided for organizing 
land into six-by-six mile townships divided into thirty-six sections of one 
square mile each, or 640 acres.12  This method of organizing western 
land was meant to create a system to facilitate the sale of these lands and 
provide for more clarity in the determination of ownership boundaries.13  
In addition to the creation of the survey system, the General Land 
Ordinance of 1785 introduced the practice of federal land grants for 
schools by reserving the section numbered sixteen in every township “for 
the maintenance of public schools within the said township.”14  
The second key federal statute, the Northwest Ordinance of 
1787, provided a system for governing the territories with the goal of 
providing territories a path to transition to statehood.15  In short, a region 
could be organized by an act of Congress to become a United States 
Territory.16  Once a Territory, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 required 
that a Territory have a population of 60,000 people to be eligible for 
statehood and inclusion into the Union.17  After reaching a population of 
60,000, the Territory could then petition Congress for admission into the 
Union.18  Congress could then pass an “enabling act” authorizing a 
                                                 
10.  Id. at 18–19; see also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 6. 
11.  An Ordinance for Ascertaining the Mode of Disposing of Lands in 
the Western Territory, in 4 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 520, 520–21 
(1823); see also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 6. 
12.  See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 8, 18.  
13.  CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 6–7.  
14.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 18.  
15.  An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United 
States North-West of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 (1787) [hereinafter Northwest 
Ordinance]; see also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 5, at 7.  
16.  Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at 51–53.  
17.  Id.  This requirement was not always enforced.  Nevada was 
admitted to the Union despite not reaching the required population requirement in 
1864 to ensure Lincoln’s Electoral College victory in the national election.  See 
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 20, 22.  
18.  Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at 51; SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 
3, at 18. 
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constitutional convention in the potential new state.19  If the potential 
state’s constitution passed popular referendum in the Territory, Congress 
could accept the state’s constitution and the new state would be admitted 
to the Union on an equal footing with all others.20  Of key importance to 
this discussion, upon joining the Union, each state’s enabling act 
provided for the grant of federal lands to the state, the terms of which 
differed and evolved over time.21 
 
B. Variation in Amount of Lands Granted: State-by-State Accession 
 During territorial and statehood negotiations, each state made an 
individual land grant deal with the federal government.22  Notably, the 
later a state joined the Union, the larger the grant of federal lands that 
state received in its enabling act became.23  The original thirteen colonies 
                                                 
19.  Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. at 51; SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 
3, at 18.  
20.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 18.  
21.  See CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 7.  
22.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 8, 18–33.  Note that states and 
territories were also provided other land grants:   
 
The original reservation grants for common schools were also 
accompanied by increasingly generous ‘block’ grants for the 
support of other public institutions.  For example, the 1841 
Preemption Act granted five hundred thousand acres of land to 
every public land state for a variety of public purposes; later, the 
Agricultural College Act of 1862 granted lands to all of the states 
that were not in active rebellion against the Union to endow 
agricultural and mechanical colleges (when the war ended, this 
grant was extended to the southern states as well).  Other grant 
programs transferred lands to states to finance internal 
improvements, such as railroads.   
 
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 4.  
23.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 19–24, 27.  There are varying 
explanations for the differences in the size of the federal lands grants to states over 
time.  Id. at 27.  One potential explanation is that later states, such as Utah, Nevada, 
Arizona, and New Mexico, were more arid and thus the land was less valuable, 
which required the Federal land grant be larger to achieve the purposes of the grant.  
Id.  Another explanation is that western states gained more political power over time.  
Id.  In addition, land policy shifted over time.  “The pattern adopted by most states 
admitted to the Union before 1850 was to sell trust lands and give the money directly 
to the schools.  After 1850, many states retained ownership of trust lands as a stable 
source of funding for their education institutions.”  Tom Schultz & Tommy Butler, 
Managing Montana’s Trust Lands, 41 MONT. BUS. Q., Winter 2003, at 1; see also 
CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 9.  
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plus Vermont, Tennessee, and Kentucky, joined the Union between 1785 
and 1803 and did not receive any land grants upon becoming states.24  
Between 1803 and 1858 fourteen additional states joined the Union, each 
receiving section sixteen of every township as a common school grant 
under the Northwest Ordinance of 1785.25  Between 1859 and 1890, 
states began to receive double the amount of the original federal land 
grant, receiving section thirty-six, in addition to section sixteen, of every 
township as common school grants upon acceptance to the Union.26  
Beginning in 1896, states began negotiating yet more generous federal 
land grants.27  In 1896, the federal government granted Utah sections 
sixteen, thirty-six, two, and thirty-two of every township.28  New Mexico 
and Arizona also received these same four sections of each township.29   
                                                 
24.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 19.  These states, referred to 
by Souder and Fairfax as phase-one states:  
 
provide a basis of comparison with subsequent states, because no 
federal land lay within their borders.  Phase-one states had to 
organize their own tax base to support schools and other public 
functions.  In subsequent states, by contrast, the federal 
government owned large tracts of land, and was called upon to 
contribute to the development of public institutions.   
 
Id.  
25.  Id. at 19–22.  These states included Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, 
Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, Florida, Iowa, 
Wisconsin, California, and Minnesota.  Id.  Two states, Maine and Texas, which 
joined the Union during this time period, received no common school grant lands 
from the federal government.  See id. at 20–22.  Texas included no federal public 
domain lands because it was a former independent republic and thus received no 
school land grants.  Id. at 22. 
26.  Id. at 20–23.  The exception was West Virginia, which was 
admitted in 1863 with no grant of lands from the federal government.  Id. at 20.  
States that received the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of every township 
included Oregon, Kansas, Nevada, Nebraska, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Washington, Idaho, and Wyoming.  Id. at 20–21.  
27.  Id. at 20–23.   
28.  Id.   
29.  Id.  Alaska and Hawaii, which joined the Union much later were 
treated quite differently than other states.  Id. at 23.  For instance, Alaska’s statehood 
bill allowed the State twenty-five years to choose 102.5 million acres of unreserved 
land and fifty years to selection an additional 800,000 acres of national forest land.  
Id.  “The value of those selections rights was significantly reduced when state 
selections were halted and both the federal government and the state’s Native 
Americans moved to the front of the land-grab queue with almost 200 million acres 
of selection rights, as a result of the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act.”  Id.  In 
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There are varying explanations for the differences in the size of 
the federal lands grants to states over time.30  One potential explanation 
is that states admitted to the Union later, such as Utah, Nevada, Arizona, 
and New Mexico, were more arid and thus the land was less valuable.31  
Because sale or lease for agriculture was the primary use of the early 
land grants, the western federal land grants needed to be larger to raise 
funds comparable to the more fertile states.32  In short, the states in the 
West required a larger quantity of land to produce the necessary revenue 
to support schools and other public institutions.33  Another explanation is 
that western states gained more political power over time.34   
The federal land grant to Montana came in the middle of the 
pack.  In 1889, Montana was admitted to the Union as a part of a single 
Omnibus Enabling Act, along with North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Washington.35  Through this Omnibus Enabling Act, Montana received 
sections sixteen and thirty-six of every township “for the support of 
common schools.”36  Today Montana retains approximately 90% of its 
original land grant of five million acres.37 
 
C. The Variety of Federal Land Grant Recipients 
 As discussed above, the amount of land granted by Congress 
varied over time.  Similarly, Congress’s grant of federal lands also varied 
over time with regard to whom the lands were granted.38  Initially, 
Congress took a township-centered approach, granting land to a township 
for use by schools in that township.39  Some later lands were granted to 
benefit schools in a township, but were directed to be managed by the 
county.40  Later still, because some local townships abused their trust 
responsibilities, Congress granted lands for the benefit of the schools in a 
                                                                                                             
Hawaii, the statehood act ratified a trust on royal lands but it is not based on the 
cadastral system of the lower forty-eight.  Id. at 24.  
30.  Id. at 27.  
31.  Id. 
32.  Id.  
33.  CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 9 (“[T]he organized 
ranching, mineral, and timber industries that would eventually be able to utilize at 
least some portion of these lands had not yet come to flower.”).  
34.  Id.  
35.  Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676. 
36.  Id.  
37.  CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 98.  
38.  Id. at 7–8.  
39.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 29–30.   
40.  Id. at 30.  
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township but vested administration with the state.41  Lastly, Congress 
granted the lands for the benefit of the schools in the state and provided 
for state administration.42 
Montana fell toward the later end of this progression.  Montana’s 
Omnibus Enabling Act granted sections sixteen and thirty-six in every 
township to the State for the support of the common schools.43  As a 
result, Montana was able to begin a school system with a centralized 
source of funds.44 
 
D. How Federal Land Grants Came to Be Viewed as a Trust – The Trend 
Toward Uniformity 
Given how common it is today to refer to federal land grants to 
the states as “state school trust lands,” it may surprise some to learn that 
“trust” in state school trust lands was not a specific requirement in early 
enabling acts.45  Rather, the trust notion developed over time and indeed, 
prior to 1910, the legal trust requirement came from each individual 
state’s commitments in state constitutions, as opposed to individual 
federal enabling acts.46   
Prior to 1910, the exact language stating the purpose of each 
federal land grant varied slightly, but significantly.  For example, a 
typical grant prior to 1860 granted the lands “for the maintenance of the 
schools.”47  During the 1860s, the wording changed to “for the support of 
common schools.”48  In 1907, the wording changed again when 
Oklahoma was granted land “for the use and benefit of common 
schools.”49  Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act actually used two 
different phrases within the Act itself, granting lands “for the support of 
common schools,” but also authorizing in lieu selections of excluded 
                                                 
41.  Id.; see also Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 2.  
42.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 30.   
43.  Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, § 10, 25 Stat. 676, 679.  
44.  SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 30.   
45.  See id. at 33–36. 
46.  Sally K. Fairfax, Jon A. Souder & Gretta Goldenman, The School 
Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 808 (1992); 
see also SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33.  Note that case law, very early on, 
established the notion of the land grants as a trust.  See In re Powder River Drainage 
Area, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985) (citing Trs. of Vincennes Univ. v. Indiana, 55 U.S. 
268 (1852); Springfield Twp. v. Quick, 63 U.S. 56 (1895)). 
47.  Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 818.  
48.  Id.  
49.  Enabling Act of Oklahoma of 1906, Pub. L. No. 234, § 7, 34 Stat. 
267, 272; see also Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 818. 
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mineral lands for the “use and benefit of the common schools.”50  By 
contrast, no enabling act directly incorporated the use of the word “trust” 
until the accession of Arizona and New Mexico to the Union in 1912.51 
The Enabling Act of New Mexico and Arizona expressly provides that:  
 
all lands hereby granted, including those which, having 
been heretofore granted to the said Territory, are hereby 
expressly transferred and confirmed to the said State, 
shall be by the State held in trust . . . and that the natural 
products and money proceeds of any of said lands shall 
be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the 
same.52   
 
This Enabling Act also specified that the disposition of any lands, 
money, or thing of value derived directly or indirectly from such lands 
for any object other than that expressly granted or confirmed “shall be 
deemed a breach of trust.”53 
Prior to New Mexico and Arizona’s Enabling Act, states’ 
individual constitutions imposed a specific trustee relationship on their 
own terms.54  For example, despite the lack of an explicitly imposed trust 
relationship in the Omnibus Enabling Act, Montana’s 1889 Constitution 
accepted that the federal grant of land would be “held in trust for the 
people, to be disposed of as hereafter provided for the respective 
purposes for which they have been or may be granted.”55  Montana’s 
1972 Constitution continued those terms.56 
Given the variety in the language of the grants and each state’s 
unique incorporation of such grants into a state constitution, it is not 
surprising that early case law often did not clearly recognize or cite to 
trust principles.  For example, in the 1920s and 1930s state courts did not 
cite to either enabling acts or constitutional provisions to bar state 
agencies from disposing of state school lands for diverse state purposes 
                                                 
50.  Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, §§ 10, 18, 25 Stat. 676, 
679, 681–82. 
51.  New Mexico and Arizona Enabling Act of 1910, Pub. L. No. 219, 
§§ 10, 28, 36 Stat. 557, 563, 574.  
52.  Id.  
53.  Id.  
54. See SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33. 
55.  MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1. 
56.  MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; see also Dep’t of State Lands v. 
Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 951 (Mont. 1985).  
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not specifically benefitting the trust.57  Similarly, federal courts did not 
find enabling acts or state constitutions an obstacle to an uncompensated 
state grant of right-of-way across school lands for irrigation.58 
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court, in Lassen v. Arizona 
Highway Department,59 largely clarified the appropriateness of applying 
trust principles when analyzing how states interpret the purpose of 
federal land grants.  In Lassen, the Supreme Court relied on the express 
trust relationship established in the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act 
to conclude that the State must “compensate the trust in money for the 
full appraised value of any material sites or right of way which it obtains 
on or over trust lands.”60  Soon, courts across the West embraced the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Lassen, regardless of the exact language of 
the State’s enabling act and constitution.61  Thus, despite the relatively 
unique trust-specific language contained in the New Mexico-Arizona 
Enabling Act, the analysis in Lassen became the standard that defined the 
trust responsibility.62  The Lassen analysis related to all state school 
lands without import as to the unique nature of the New Mexico-Arizona 
Enabling Act and other historical differences between the States.63  As a 
result of courts applying Lassen, uniformity emerged in the interpretation 
of state school land grants and the trust relationship, and the 
responsibility established by such grants.64  One analysis of such cases 
determined that “[j]udicial reliance on simplified versions of precedent 
from other states is characteristic of the school lands cases in general,” 
and is exacerbated by reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in 
                                                 
57. See, e.g., Grosetta v. Choate, 75 P.2d 1031 (Ariz. 1938); see also 
SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33.   
58.  Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 502 (1923); see also SOUDER & 
FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 33–34.  
59. Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967). 
60. Id. at 469. 
61. E.g., United States v. 78.61 Acres of Land in Dawes & Sioux 
Cntys., 265 F. Supp. 564, 566 (1967) (noting the Nebraska Enabling Act “did not 
contain the express restrictions which were incorporated in later, similar acts,” but 
nevertheless determined that the “grant was undoubtedly in trust for a specific 
purpose”); United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land in Ferry Cnty., 293 F. Supp. 1042 
(E.D. Wash. 1968), aff’d 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding the State could not 
donate school land to the federal government).  
62. SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 3, at 34–36. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. (citing Cnty. of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 
1984) (A recent case involving state school trust lands that shows an “admixture of 
citations from diverse jurisdictions without adequate reference to differences in state 
obligations, and the centrality of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions without apparent 
awareness that importations from Arizona and New Mexico were occurring.”).  
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Lassen, interpreting the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act as opposed 
to the specific state law involved.65  The result is an eroding appreciation 
of the differences in state accession bargains—one that often leaves the 
impression that the federal land grants are trusts that are all virtually the 
same.  
 
III.  MONTANA’S STATE SCHOOL TRUST LANDS – THE 
IMPORTANCE OF MONTANA’S UNIQUE HISTORY AND TRUST 
MANDATE 
 
Regardless of the trend in uniformity in interpreting federal land 
grants to states, it remains important to review and understand the 
specific history of Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act, Constitution, and 
statutory and administrative scheme to determine what the trust mandate 
means for Montana’s beneficiaries and land managers.  
 
A. Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act 
As discussed above, in 1889, Montana, along with North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Washington,66 was admitted to the Union as a part of 
a single Omnibus Enabling Act.  Through this Omnibus Enabling Act, 
Montana received sections sixteen and thirty-six of every township “for 
the support of common schools.”67  In cases where sections sixteen and 
thirty-six, or parts of these sections, had already been sold or otherwise 
disposed of, the State was granted other equivalent lands known as “in 
lieu” lands to be selected by the State in a manner provided by the 
legislature with approval of the Secretary of Interior.68  The federal land 
grant provided that these “in lieu” lands were also granted “for the 
support of the common schools.”69  No lands that already had a federal 
reservation were to be subject to the land grant, including any Indian or 
military reservations.70   
                                                 
65. Id. at 35–36.    
66. Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 676 (“An act 
to provide for the division of Dakota into two States and to enable the people of 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to form constitutions and 
State governments and to be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the 
original States, and to make donations of public lands to such States.”).  
67. Id. § 10, 25 Stat. at 679.  
68. Id.  The selection of “in lieu” lands by the State has yet to be 
finalized over one century later.  
69. Id.   
70. Id. (“Provided, That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections embraced 
in permanent reservations for national purposes shall not, at any time, be subject to 
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The land grant also specifically exempted from selection by the 
State lands determined by the Department of Interior to be “mineral 
lands.”71  Instead, the federal government authorized the State to pick 
lands “in lieu” of such mineral lands “for the use and the benefit of the 
common schools.”72  In 1927, however, the Jones Act retroactively 
granted states, including Montana, sections that were “mineral in 
character,” including mineral title to lands already granted, with limited 
exceptions.73  The Jones Act grants came with restrictions.74  Under the 
Act, Montana is prohibited from selling minerals and is limited to leasing 
such minerals, “the proceeds and rentals and royalties therefrom to be 
utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public schools.”75  
Any minerals disposed of contrary to the Jones Act must be forfeited to 
the United States.76 
In addition to the grant of federal lands for the support of the 
common schools, the Omnibus Enabling Act placed certain restrictions 
on Montana’s disposal of such lands and required that proceeds of such 
land sales constitute a permanent fund, “the interest of which only shall 
be expended in the support of said schools.”77  The limits set out in the 
Omnibus Enabling Act on the legislature’s ability to dispose of the 
                                                                                                             
the grants nor to the indemnity provisions of this act, nor shall any lands embraced in 
Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to the grants or to 
the indemnity provision of this act until the reservation shall have been extinguished 
and such lands be restored to, and become a part of, the public domain.”).  The story 
of state land selection is much more complex than this provision of the Omnibus 
Enabling Act implies.  For a detailed history of state land selection in Montana, see 
GEORGE WESLEY BURNETT, JR., MONTANA BECOMES A LANDLORD: A STUDY OF 
STATE LAND SELECTION (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Oklahoma), available at https://shareok.org/bitstream/handle/11244/4222/7712732. 
PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.  
71. Omnibus Enabling Act, § 18, 25 Stat. at 681–82; see also CULP, 
CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 11.  
72. Omnibus Enabling Act, § 18, 25 Stat. at 681–82.  
73. Jones Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 570, § 1, 44 Stat. 1026, 1026 
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 870 (2012)) (“Subject to the provisions of subsections (a), 
(b), and (c) of this section, the several grants to the States of numbered sections in 
place for the support or in aid of common or public schools be, and they are hereby, 
extended to embrace numbered school sections mineral in character, unless land has 
been granted to and/or selected by and certified or approved, to any such State or 
States as indemnity or in lieu of any land so granted by numbered sections.”); see 
also CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 12.  
74. Jones Act of 1927, § 1, 44 Stat. at 1026. 
75. Id. § 1, 44 Stat. at 1026–27. 
76. Id. § 1, 44 Stat. at 1027. 
77. Omnibus Enabling Act, § 11, 25 Stat. at 679–80.   
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school lands changed slightly over time.78  Initially, all lands granted for 
educational purposes had to be disposed of at public sale for not less than 
ten dollars per acre, and could be leased under regulations created by the 
legislature for not more than five years.79  In 1932, Congress amended 
the Omnibus Enabling Act to provide for more specific prices and lease 
periods for different resources and agricultural products.80  The 
amendment also provided that the State may, upon terms it prescribed, 
grant easements and rights in the lands, and added that:  
 
none of such lands, nor any estate or interest therein, 
shall ever be disposed of except in pursuance of general 
laws providing for such disposition, nor unless the full 
market value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be 
ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law, 
has been paid or safely secured to the State.81   
 
Any such disposition constituted “permanent funds for the support and 
maintenance of the public schools.”82 
 
B. Montana’s Constitutional and Statutory Trust Mandate 
Montana’s trust mandate for school lands originated with 
Montana’s 1889 Constitution.83  The 1889 Constitution accepted that the 
federal grant of land would be “held in trust for the people, to be 
disposed of as hereafter provided for the respective purposes for which 
they have been or may be granted.”84  Montana’s 1972 Constitution 
continued those terms.85  Specifically, Montana’s 1972 Constitution, 
Article X, Section 11, provides, in relevant part: 
 
Public land trust, disposition. (1) All lands of the state 
that have been or may be granted by congress, or 
                                                 
78. See, e.g., Act of May 7, 1932, Pub. L. No. 124, 47 Stat. 150, 
amending Omnibus Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676.  
79. Id.  
80. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 150. 
81. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 151. 
82. Id. 
83. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XVII, § 1. 
84. Id.; see also MOON, supra note 4, at 13.   
85. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11; see also Dep’t of State Lands v. 
Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 951 (Mont. 1985); Montanans for the Responsible Use of 
the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800, 803 (Mont. 
1999).  
WILES PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/24/2017 8:03 PM 
 
  
162 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 38 
 
acquired by gift or grant or devise from any person or 
corporation, shall be public lands of the state. They shall 
be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as 
hereafter provided, for the respective purposes for which 
they have been or may be granted, donated or devised. 
(2) No such land or any estate or interest therein shall 
ever be disposed of except in pursuance of general laws 
providing for such disposition, or until the full market 
value of the estate or interest disposed of, to be 
ascertained in such manner as may be provided by law, 
has been paid or safely secured to the state.  
(3) No land which the state holds by grant from the 
United States which prescribes the manner of disposal 
and minimum price shall be disposed of except in the 
manner and for at least the price prescribed without the 
consent of the United States.86  
 
Montana’s legislature further expanded upon the trust mandate 
found in Montana’s Constitution.  For example, the legislature codified 
restrictions on the State’s right to sell or transfer these lands: “All sales 
of state lands shall be only at public auction held at the county 
courthouse of the county in which the lands are located.”87  In addition, 
the State is not allowed to sell valuable mineral lands,88 or state land 
bordering on navigable lakes, non-navigable meander lakes, and 
navigable streams.89  
 The State has other less known restrictions on school trust lands.  
For instance, the Montana legislature has enacted express restrictions on 
the management of state forest lands.90  Specifically: 
The board and the [D]epartment [of Natural Resources 
and Conservation] are prohibited from designating, 
                                                 
86. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 11 (emphasis original). 
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-321 (2015); Act of May 7, 1932, Pub. L. 
No. 124, 47 Stat. 150, amending Omnibus Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676. 
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-303(1).  This restriction on the sale of 
valuable mineral deposits includes both the surface and mineral estate for lands that 
are likely to contain coal, oil, oil shale, phosphate, metals, sodium, or “other 
valuable mineral deposits,” but does not prohibit the sale of lands containing sand, 
gravel, building stone, brick clay, or other similar materials.  Id.  
89. Id. § 77-2-303(2)(3).  This restriction excludes lands previously 
leased as cabin sites and allows for the granting of easements and the leasing of such 
lands.  Id.  
90. Id. § 77-5-116. 
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treating, or disposing of any interest in state forest lands 
for the preservation or nonuse of these lands prior to 
obtaining funds for the affected beneficiary equal to the 
full market value of that designation, treatment, or 
disposition. Unless the full market value of the property 
interest or of the revenue foregone is obtained, the board 
and the department are prohibited from either 
temporarily or permanently designating, treating, or 
disposing of any interest in any state forest lands for the 
following purposes: (1) as a natural area pursuant to 
Title 76, chapter 12, part 1, or as otherwise provided for 
by law; (2) as open-space land as defined in 76-6-104; 
(3) for old growth timber preservation; and (4) as a 
wildlife management area.91  
The State legislature has also included restrictions on the 
exchange of state school trust lands.92  The land exchange may only 
occur with specific listed entities.93  Moreover, the land received must be 
of “equal or greater value, as determined by the [B]oard [of Land 
Commissioners] after appraisal by a qualified land appraiser, than the 
state land and as closely as possible equal in area.”94  In addition, 
exchanges that involve state lands bordering navigable lakes and streams 
or other bodies of water with significant public use value may be 
exchanged for nongovernment-owned land only if it borders similar 
navigable lakes, streams, or other bodies of water.95 
Finally, the State’s Land Banking Program, which authorizes the 
State to use the proceeds from the sale of state school trust lands to buy 
other lands, also sets forth specific restrictions for the selection of land 
banking parcels.96  Land banking is designed to improve the overall 
returns to the trust and increase public access to state lands through the 
sale of state lands that are predominantly isolated in nature, or not legally 
                                                 
91. Id.  
92. Id. § 77-2-203.  
93. Id. (“Subject to subsection (2), the board is authorized to exchange 
state land for land owned by: (a) the state or an agency of the state; (b) a political 
subdivision of the state, including a county, city, town, public corporation, or district 
created pursuant to state law; (c) any other public body of the state; or (d) a 
nongovernmental entity, including but not limited to an individual, association, 
partnership, or corporation.”). 
94. Id. § 77-2-203(2). 
95. Id. § 77-2-203(3); see also Skyline Sportsmen’s Ass’n v. Bd. of 
Land Comm’rs, 951 P.2d 29 (Mont. 1997). 
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-364. 
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accessible.97  The State must realize the full market value of the land sold 
through the program.98  In addition, when purchasing land, easements, or 
improvements for existing trusts, specific appraisal and revenue 
projection procedures must be used to ensure that the proposed purchase 
is “likely to produce more net revenue for the affected trust than the 
revenue that was produced from the land that was sold, among other 
restrictions.”99 
C. Montana’s Trust Administration:  The Role of the State Board of Land 
Commissioners and the Montana Department of Natural Resources and 
Conservation 
Besides establishing a trust relationship between the State and 
various institutional beneficiaries, Montana’s Constitution addressed 
arrangements for administration of the trust.100  Montana’s Constitution, 
Article X, Section 4 states: 
                                                 
97. Id.; see also Memorandum from Tom Schultz, Adm’r, Trust Land 
Mgmt. Div., to EQC Agency Oversight Subcomm., DNRC Rulemaking 1 (Oct. 8, 
2003), available at http://leg.mt.gov/content/committees/interim/2003_2004/ 
environmental_quality_council/subcommittees/agency_oversight/minutes/eqcao100
82003_ex12.pdf.  
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-364(2). 
99. Id. § 77-2-364(4), (5) (“Prior to purchasing any land, easements, or 
improvements, the board shall determine that the financial risks and benefits of the 
purchase are prudent, financially productive investments that are consistent with the 
board's fiduciary duty as a reasonably prudent trustee of a perpetual trust. For the 
purposes of implementing 77-2-361 through 77-2-367, that duty requires the board 
to: (a) discharge its duties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that a prudent 
person acting in a similar capacity with the same resources and familiar with similar 
matters should exercise in the conduct of an enterprise of similar character and aims; 
(b) diversify the land holdings of each trust to minimize the risk of loss and 
maximize the sustained rate of return; (c) discharge its duties and powers solely in 
the interest of and for the benefit of the trust managed; (d) discharge its duties 
subject to the fiduciary standards set forth in 72-38-801; and (e) maintain, as closely 
as possible, the existing land base of each trust, consistent with the state's fiduciary 
duty. (6) Prior to purchasing a parcel of land in excess of 160 acres in any particular 
county, the board shall consult with the county commissioners of the county in 
which the parcel is located.”).  
100. See Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 818.  
Congressional enabling acts never required establishment of a commission or board 
to administer the trust.  Id.  Rather, Oregon appears to be the first state to create a 
land commission consisting of the governor, the secretary of state, and the state 
treasurer.  Id.  Other states adopted the idea, but with variations.  Id.  Yet other states 
rejected this idea, providing in constitutions that the legislature was responsible for 
dealing with the school lands, including Washington and North Dakota, two states 
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Board of land commissioners. The governor, 
superintendent of public instruction, auditor, secretary of 
state, and attorney general constitute the board of land 
commissioners. It has the authority to direct, control, 
lease, exchange, and sell school lands and lands which 
have been or may be granted for the support and benefit 
of the various state educational institutions, under such 
regulations and restrictions as may be provided by 
law.101 
Montana’s legislature clarified the role of the Board of Land 
Commissioners (“Board”) in Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-604.102  
The Board exercises general authority, direction, and control over the 
care, management, and disposition of state lands and, subject to the 
investment authority of the Board of Investments, the funds arising from 
the leasing, use, sale, and disposition of those lands or otherwise coming 
under its administration.103  In its exercise of such authority, the Board is 
guided by the general principle that state school trust lands and funds 
“are held in trust for the support of education and for the attainment of 
other worthy objects helpful to the well-being of the people of this state 
as provided in The Enabling Act.”104 As such, “the Board shall 
administer this trust to: (1) secure the largest measure of legitimate and 
reasonable advantage to the state; and (2) provide for the long-term 
financial support of education.”105 
The Board is also required to manage state lands under the 
multiple-use management concept.106  Multiple-use is: 
                                                                                                             
under the Omnibus Enabling Act with Montana.  Id.; see also MOON, supra note 4, 
at 13.  
101. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 4; see also MONT. CONST. of 1889, Art. XI, 
§ 4 (emphasis original). 
102. The Montana legislature has a general statement of policy with 
regard to state trust lands that reads: “It is in the best interest and to the great 
advantage of the state of Montana to seek the highest development of state-owned 
lands in order that they might be placed to their highest and best use and thereby 
derive greater revenue for the support of the common schools, the university system, 
and other institutions benefiting therefrom, and that in so doing the economy of the 
local community as well as the state is benefited as a result of the impact of such 
development.”  MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-604. 
103. Id. § 77-1-202(1). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. § 77-1-203. 
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defined as management of all the various resources of 
the state lands so that:  (a) they are utilized in that 
combination best meeting the needs of the people and 
the beneficiaries of the trust, making the most judicious 
use of the land for some or all of those resources or 
related services over areas large enough to provide 
sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to 
conform to changing needs and conditions and realizing 
that some land may be used for less than all of the 
resources; and (b) harmonious and coordinated 
management of the various resources, each with the 
other, will result without impairment of the productivity 
of the land, with consideration being given to the relative 
values of the various resources.107   
 
Such multiple-use principles, however, do not negate or supersede the 
trust mandate of Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act and Constitution.108  
Under the direction of the Board, the Montana Department of 
Natural Resources and Conservation (“DNRC”) “has charge of the 
selecting, exchange, classification, appraisal, leasing, management, sale, 
or other disposition of the state lands.”109  It is also required to perform 
such “other duties the Board directs, the purpose of the department 
demands, or the statutes require.”110  DNRC must also collect and receive 
all monies payable to it through its office as fees, rentals, royalties, 
interest, penalties, or payments on mortgages or land purchased from the 
State or derived from any other source.111  Under direction of the Board, 
DNRC is further responsible for selecting and locating lands granted to 
Montana by the United States for any purpose, including the “in lieu” 
lands.112  
 
D. DNRC’s Administration of State School Trust Lands 
 
DNRC is comprised of four distinct divisions: Forestry Division, 
Water Resources Division, Conservation and Resource Development 
                                                 
107.  Id. § 77-1-203(1). 
108. See David Woodgerd & Bernard F. McCarthy, State School Trust 
Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 119, 125 (1982). 
109. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-301(1). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. § 77-1-301(2). 
112. Id. § 77-1-304. 
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Division, and Trust Land Management Division.113  The Trust Land 
Management Division, as its name implies, administers and manages the 
state trust surface and mineral resources for the benefit of the common 
schools and other endowed institutions.114  It is first and foremost an 
asset management organization.115  A brief description of each bureau 
within the Trust Lands Management Division illustrates that although 
historically managed for natural resource extraction, it has further 
broadened its land-use activities to include other uses that may generate 
greater revenue such as commercial, residential, industrial, renewable 
energy, and conservation leasing.116   
The Trust Lands Management Division consists of four separate 
bureaus.  First, the Agriculture and Grazing Management Bureau is 
responsible for the leasing and management of agriculture and 
rangelands.117  It manages approximately 9,000 agricultural and grazing 
leases throughout the State.  The Agriculture and Grazing Management 
Bureau also oversees the recreational use program on state trust lands 
and ensures compliance with the Montana Antiquities Act.118  Second, 
the Forest Management Bureau manages over 780,000 acres of forested 
state trust land.119  The Forest Management Bureau’s activities include 
the sale of forest products and the Forest Improvement Program, which 
uses fees from harvested timber to improve the health, productivity, and 
value of forested trust lands.120  Third, the Minerals Management Bureau 
is responsible for leasing, permitting, and managing approximately 1,876 
oil and gas, metalliferous and non-metalliferous minerals, coal, and sand 
and gravel agreements on over 750,000 acres of the available 6.2 million 
mineral acres of school trust land and approximately 11,885 acres of 
other state-owned land throughout Montana.121  As of 2016, the Minerals 
Management Bureau manages 1,742 oil and gas leases and 35 coal 
leases.122  Finally, the Real Estate Management Bureau manages all land 
                                                 
113. The Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation is administratively 
attached to DNRC. 
114. MONTANA DNRC TRUST LANDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION, ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2016), available at http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/trust/docs/annual-
report/fy-2016-trust-lands-annual-report.pdf [hereinafter DNRC ANNUAL REPORT]. 
115. Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 5. 
116. Id. 
117. DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 7. 
118. Id. at 8. 
119. Id. at 9–11. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 12. 
122. Id. 
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ownership transactions on trust land.123  This includes all permanent 
dispositions and acquisitions of land, specifically the land banking 
program, the cabin site sales program, and land exchanges.124  The Real 
Estate Management Bureau also oversees the leasing program which 
involves residential cabin and home-site leasing and the granting of 
rights-of-way and easements.125  More recently, this Bureau developed a 
strong commercial leasing program for development of state trust land, 
consisting of mostly commercial ground leasing for retail development 
and renewable energy.126   
 
E. A Snapshot of Montana’s State School Trust Lands 
Montana presently retains a vast majority of its original land 
grant, over five million acres of school trust lands.127  “The original 
common school grant in Montana was for 5,188,000 acres, with an 
additional 668,720 acres granted for other endowed institutions.”128  
Montana continues to hold the majority of its lands in the dispersed 
pattern in which they were granted—section sixteen and thirty-six of 
each township.129  The checkerboard pattern is typical for states that 
retain school trust lands throughout the West and it brings significant 
management challenges.130  
 
                                                 
123. Id. at 14. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. at 15. 
126. Id. 
127. CULP, CONRADI & TUELL, supra note 4, at 98.  
128. Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 4. 
129. See DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 2 (map of Montana 
Trust Lands showing dispersed pattern of ownership). 
130. Fairfax, Souder & Goldenman, supra note 46, at 832.  “Most 
obviously, it is difficult to plan for and administer scattered parcels of land.”  Id.  In 
addition, the “scattering of state-owned parcels means that state granted lands are 
likely to be surrounded by neighbors—especially the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau 
of Land Management—who operate under a significantly different management 
mandate than the state, and who frequently do not share the state’s priorities.” 
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DNRC manages lands held in trust under the original land grant 
in the Omnibus Enabling Act for the common schools, but it also 
manages other lands in trust for other institutions.  For example, the 
Omnibus Enabling Act and subsequent legislation granted acreage for 
other educational and state institutions.131  Thus, DNRC manages all of 
these lands in trust for their intended beneficiaries.  The total acreage of 
school trust lands fluctuates slightly each year due to land sales and 
acquisitions.132  Mineral acreage for each trust generally exceeds surface 
acreage because the mineral estate was retained when lands were sold.133  




                                                 
131. Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, §§ 12–17, 25 Stat. 676, 
680–81 (public buildings at the capital, universities, penitentiary); DNRC ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 114, at 2 (map of Montana Trust Lands showing dispersed 
pattern of ownership). 
132. See DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 5 (map of Montana 
Trust Lands showing dispersed pattern of ownership). 
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-2-304 (2015).  
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GRANT    ACREAGE  
 
Common Public Schools   4,616,534 surface acres 
5,596,963 mineral acres 
 
University of Montana   17,262 surface acres 
33,754 mineral acres 
 
Montana State University   63,474 surface acres 
Morrill grant    77,929 mineral acres 
 
Montana State University   31,686 surface acres 
Second Grant    46,598 mineral acres 
 
Montana Tech University   59,356 surface acres 
of Montana    86,267 mineral acres 
 
State Normal School   63,217 surface acres 
80,455 mineral acres 
 
School for the Deaf & Blind  36,461 surface acres 
     41,171 mineral acres 
 
State Reform School   67,295 surface acres 
73,488 mineral acres 
 
Veterans Home    1,417 surface acres 
     1,276 mineral acres 
 
Public Buildings    184,656 surface acres 
172,323 mineral acres 
 
Acquired Lands    32,295 surface acres 
0 mineral acres 
 
Sir Trust134    2,600 surface acres 
     0  mineral acres 
  ___________________ 
TOTALS 5,176,252 surface acres 
     6,210,224 mineral acres135 
                                                 
134. Sir Trust is split equally between the School for the Deaf and Blind, 
the Montana Development Center, and the Montana State Hospital.  See DNRC 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 5 (map of Montana Trust Lands showing 
dispersed pattern of ownership).  This trust was acquired via a private donation and 
thus did not originate with a Federal land grant.  
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Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act requires that proceeds from 
the sale and permanent disposition of any trust lands, or interest therein, 
constitute permanent funds for the support and maintenance of public 
schools and various state institutions for which the lands were granted.136  
Montana’s Constitution requires that these permanent funds “shall 
forever remain inviolate, guaranteed by the state against loss or 
diversion.”137  At the end of fiscal year 2016, the permanent fund balance 
was approximately $636.8 million.138  Total revenue for 2016 was $22.1 
million.139  The 2016 revenue was down slightly from past years, due to 
lower commodity market prices for beef, grain, and oil and gas.140  
Activities on state trust lands reduce the tax burden on Montana’s 
taxpayers by paying an average of 10% of the yearly revenue needed to 
fund K-12 schools in Montana.141  Unmistakably, DNRC’s management 
of the school trust lands is a large scale operation with significant 
impacts in Montana.  
 
F. Current Market Conditions – Commercial Leasing Program 
Currently an increasing demand exists for commercial 
development of school trust lands located close to or within urban 
settings.142  Therefore, DNRC is further developing its commercial 
leasing program and increasing its number of commercial leases.  In 
2016, DNRC executed two new leases and signed three new Options to 
Lease for potential commercial development, generating a total of 
$47,500 in new annual revenues.143  At the end of 2016, there were 134 
active commercial leases on state school trust lands and annual revenues 
continue to grow each year.144 
 
                                                                                                             
135. Id. at app., tbl.8. 
136. See, e.g., Omnibus Enabling Act, § 11, 25 Stat. at 679–80. 
137. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 3.  
138. DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 17.  The Common 
Schools Permanent Fund balance was $585.7 million and the other beneficiaries’ 
Permanent Fund Balance was $51.1 million.  Id.  
139. Id.  Revenue for the Common School Permanent Fund was $20.9 
million and revenue for other beneficiaries’ Permanent Fund was $1.2 million.  Id.  
140. Id. at 7. 
141. Schultz & Butler, supra note 23, at 5. 
142. Commercial leases include all leases that are not agriculture, 
grazing, or residential in nature.  See DNRC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 15. 
143. Id.  
144. Id.  
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IV.  CASE LAW: MONTANA COURTS ESTABLISH KEY TRUST 
PRINCIPLES 
 
Early on, Montana’s courts interpreted the requirements of 
Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act as establishing a trust relationship 
between the State as trustee and the public schools as beneficiaries.145  
Once the basic principle was established, lawsuits initiated by taxpayers, 
citizen actions groups, and, more recently, environmental groups, have 
further clarified the meaning of Montana’s trust mandate.  
 
A. Montana Courts Affirm the Trust Mandate 
Montana courts have affirmed and interpreted the trust 
relationship established in Montana’s Constitution.  As early as 1896, in 
State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, the Montana Supreme Court held that the 
grant of federal land in the Omnibus Enabling Act to Montana 
constitutes a trust.146  The Court noted that its holding was in full accord 
with a decision from the Washington Supreme Court, a state that was 
granted lands under the same Omnibus Enabling Act as Montana.147  It is 
clear, however, that the Court first relied upon its analysis of the granting 
language in the Omnibus Enabling Act, and the acceptance by the State 
of this grant as a trust in its Constitution, to reach its conclusion that the 
grant of land to Montana was a trust.148   
Other early cases followed suit.  In 1913, the Court decided State 
ex rel. Gravely v. Stewart, a case where the Board of Land 
Commissioners refused to confirm a particular sale of school trust lands 
to the highest bidder at auction because the Board determined the price 
was inadequate and less than the real value of the land.149  The Court 
upheld the Board’s cancelation of the sale stating: 
 
                                                 
145. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, 43 P. 928 (Mont. 1896). 
146. Id. (“The fund created by the statute is a trust fund established by 
law in pursuance of the act of congress. . . . The state cannot use the fund created by 
this act for any purpose except as provided for by the act of congress. The state 
officers have no control over it, except to carry out the trust relation.”).  Other early 
cases confirming the existence of the trust relationship included State ex rel. Dildine 
v. Collins, 53 P. 1114 (Mont. 1898) and State ex rel. Koch v. Barret, 66 P. 504 
(Mont. 1901). See also State ex rel. Gravely v. Stewart, 137 P. 854, 855 (Mont. 
1913); Rider v. Cooney, 23 P.2d 261, 263, 305 (Mont. 1933). 
147. Bickford, 43 P. 928.  
148. Id. 
149. Gravely, 137 P. at 854–55. 
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The grant of lands for school purposes by the federal 
government to this state constitutes a trust; and the state 
board of land commissioners, as the instrumentality 
created to administer that trust, is bound, upon principles 
that are elementary, to so administer it as to secure the 
largest measure of legitimate advantage to the 
beneficiary of it.150  
 
Not long after the Court decided Stewart, the United States 
Supreme Court decided its first major case recognizing similar trust 
principles.  In Ervien v. United States, New Mexico’s land commissioner 
sought to expend 3% of the income derived from New Mexico’s school 
lands to advertise the resources and advantages of living in New Mexico 
to settlers and investors.151  State officials rationalized that such an 
expenditure was a legitimate expense in the administration of the trust 
estate, which would result in increased demand for the lands and a 
resulting increase in the proceeds to the beneficiaries.152  The Supreme 
Court disagreed with the State, finding that such actions would be a 
breach of trust.153  It held that New Mexico’s Enabling Act granted lands 
to New Mexico for an exclusive purpose and the United States had a 
right to the exact performance of the conditions it put on the land 
grant.154 
Thus, Montana’s courts recognized the trust relationship between 
the State and the beneficiaries established by the Omnibus Enabling Act 
and the United States Supreme Court held similarly when interpreting a 
similar but later Enabling Act.  For Montana, this recognition meant that 
citizen initiated lawsuits were instigated to further define the application 





                                                 
150. Id. at 855 (internal citations omitted); see, e.g., Rider, 23 P.2d 261; 
Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land 
Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800, 803 (Mont. 1999).  
151. Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 47 (1919).  New Mexico’s 
Enabling Act included specific language setting up a trust relationship between the 
state and its beneficiaries, unlike the Omnibus Enabling Act for Montana.  Enabling 
Act of New Mexico and Arizona of 1910, Pub. L. No. 219, §§ 10, 28, 36 Stat. 557, 
563, 574.  
152. Ervien, 251 U.S. at 47.  
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 47–48. 
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B. Early Citizen Challenges Define Key Trust Principles 
Montana’s citizens’ challenges to state laws or the actions of the 
State Board of Land Commissioners have generated the core case law 
interpreting and defining Montana’s trust mandate.155  These include 
cases initiated by taxpayers, citizens’ action groups, and environmental 
groups, among others.  Through such actions, Montanans have 
demonstrated the enforceability of previously defined trust principles and 
further refined the nature of the trust. 
In 1933, a Montana taxpayer filed an action against the officials 
constituting the State Board of Land Commissioners and the 
Commissioner of State Lands and Investments to enjoin the leasing of 
state lands pursuant to a statute that set a minimum and maximum bid for 
lease of state grazing lands.156  The taxpayer argued that the statute 
allowed the Board to lease state lands at a much lower rental rate than it 
had previously received and that these actions would result in lower 
revenue for the public schools and an increased burden on state 
taxpayers.157  It was in this case, Rider v. Cooney, that the Montana 
Supreme Court first held that a lease is an “interest” in land and, under 
the Omnibus Enabling Act, the State must obtain full market value for 
the lease of state lands.158   
Similarly, in 1938, a taxpayer filed lawsuit seeking an injunction 
against the State Board of Land Commissioners to prevent the State from 
entering into a pooling agreement covering state school trust lands in the 
exploration of natural gas.159  In ruling against the taxpayer, the Court, in 
Toomey v. State Board of Land Commissioners, reaffirmed the State was 
a trustee and the trustee must strictly conform to the directions of the 
                                                 
155. Rider, 23 P.2d 261 (taxpayer challenge to State Board of Land 
Commissioners lease of state grazing lands); Toomey v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 
81 P.2d 407 (1938) (taxpayer challenge to State Board of Land Commissioners use 
of natural gas pooling agreements); State ex rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 
808, 809 (1966) (bidder of agricultural lease challenge to State Board of Land 
Commissioner’s bid decision); Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust 
v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800 (Mont. 1999) (citizen’s action 
group challenge school trust land statutes); Montanans for the Responsible Use of 
the Sch. Trust v. Darkenwald, 119 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2005) (citizen’s action group 
challenge of certain other state school trust land statues); Friends of the Wild Swan 
v. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Conservation, 127 P.3d 394 (Mont. 2005) (environmental 
group challenge to Board’s methodology in evaluating timber sale transactions).  
156. Rider, 23 P.2d at 262.  
157. Id. at 263. 
158. Id. at 265–66; see also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 702 P.2d 
948, 952 (Mont. 1985). 
159. Toomey, 81 P.2d at 409.  
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trust agreement.160  Like the Court in Rider, the Toomey Court held that 
leasing lands for a term of years was a disposal of an interest or estate in 
lands and, thus, the Constitution required the State secure the full market 
value of such an interest.161  The Court stated the “matter of primary 
importance is the realization of the best price possible for the benefit of, 
and to preserve, the permanent fund.”162  The Court determined the 
Board had authority to enter into such pooling agreements and these 
agreements fully protected the State’s rights in securing its full share of 
the gas underlying its lands.163   
State ex Rel. Thompson v. Babcock is another citizen initiated 
case establishing key Montana trust principles.  In 1966, a bidder on a 
state agricultural lease sued the Board of Land Commissioners after the 
Board awarded an agricultural lease of state trust lands to a former lessee 
of the lands despite the new bidder’s higher crop-share bid.164  The Court 
upheld the Board’s discretionary authority to accept lease terms less than 
the highest bid to effectuate sustained yield concepts and ensure the 
long-term strength of the permanent fund.165 
 
C. Concerned Citizen Group Challenges: The Montrust Series 
In the late 1990s, Montanans for the Responsible Use of the 
School Trust (“Montrust”), a citizen’s action group, filed a series of three 
lawsuits that brought attention to trust land management and further 
clarified key trust principles in Montana.  
 
1. Montrust I – Strict Interpretation of Trust Duties 
In Montanans for the Responsible Use of the School Trust v. 
State ex rel. Board of Land Commissioners (“Montrust I”),166 the plaintiff 
Montrust alleged that fourteen separate state statutes relating to school 
trust lands were unconstitutional because they were in violation of the 
obligation of the State to obtain full market value for school trust 
lands.167  The district court permanently enjoined eleven of the fourteen 
                                                 
160. Id. at 414. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 416. 
163. Id. at 414–15. 
164. State ex Rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 809 (1966).  
165. Id. at 812; see also In re Powder River Drainage Area, 702 P.2d 
948, 952 (Mont. 1985). 
166. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. 
Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800 (Mont 1999). 
167. Id. at 802, 805. 
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challenged statutes, and the parties appealed to the Montana Supreme 
Court.168  In its opening discussion, the Court confirmed that the 
language in the Omnibus Enabling Act, incorporated into Montana’s 
Constitution, constituted a trust, for which the state was the trustee of 
what it called “school trust lands.”169  It further confirmed that the Board 
of Land Commissioners is the instrumentality created to administer the 
trust.170  The Court reiterated that Montana’s Constitutional provisions on 
trust land management limit the power of the legislature to dispose of 
state lands and that one such limitation is the “trust’s requirement that 
full market value be obtained for trust lands.”171  The Montrust I Court 
then analyzed each of the challenged statutes to determine if they met 
this constitutional requirement.172  This article will not address each of 
the statutes analyzed, but several examples follow.  
First, the Court considered a statute that authorized individuals 
and counties to apply to DNRC for historic right-of-way deeds to provide 
access to private property or to continue county roads.173  The statute set 
the required fee for the right-of-way based on the median values for the 
classifications of land (grazing, timber, crop, other) in 1972.174  Montrust 
argued that by fixing the fair market values at 1972 levels, the statute 
was unconstitutional because it violated the trust’s requirement to obtain 
full market value for school trust lands.175  The Court agreed and held 
that the statutory language, which gave DNRC no discretion and required 
it to use the 1972 values, violated the constitutional trust requirement to 
obtain full market value.176 
Second, the Court held the State’s rental policy of charging 3.5% 
of appraised value for cabin site leases, which resulted in below market 
                                                 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 803. 
170. Id.  
171. Id. (citing Act of May 7, 1932, Pub. L. No. 124, § 1, 47 Stat. 150, 
151, amending Omnibus Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (providing that “none 
of such lands . . . shall ever be disposed of . . . unless the full market value of the 
estate or interest disposed of, to be ascertained in such manner as may be provided 
by law, has been paid or safely secured to the State”)). 
172. Id. at 804–12; MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-1-130 (2015). 
173. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
804. 
174. Id. at 805.  
175. Id.  
176. Id.  
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rate rentals, violated the trust’s requirement that full market value be 
obtained for school trust lands and interests therein.177 
Third, in similarly exacting fashion, the Court reviewed a statute 
that authorized free permits for removal of dead, down, or inferior timber 
for fuel and domestic purposes to state residents.178  Montrust alleged the 
statute violated the State’s fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty because it 
failed to distinguish between commercially valuable timber and timber 
that lacked commercial value.179  Citing general trust law principles, the 
Court again agreed with Montrust for two main reasons.180  First, it held 
the statute violated the trust’s mandate to obtain full market value.  
Second, the Court held the statute violated the State’s duty of undivided 
loyalty to the trust when it failed to distinguish between commercially 
valuable timber and timber that lacked commercial value because it 
authorized the State to issue firewood permits to third parties without 
charging them for any commercially valuable wood collected.181 
Fourth, the Court reviewed a statute that allowed a former lessee 
on agricultural lands up to sixty days to remove moveable improvements 
from the state trust lands without any cost to the former lessee.182  The 
Court determined that the statute violated the constitutional requirement 
to obtain full market value because it allowed former lessees to remain 
on trust lands free of charge and authorized DNRC’s practice to postpone 
new leases without compensation to the trust while the former lessee 
exercised their removal rights.183  The statute thus denied the trust’s 
beneficiaries of the full benefit of the trust lands and violated the duty of 
undivided loyalty by benefiting a third party to the detriment of the 
beneficiaries.184   
Finally, the Court reviewed a statute that required new 
agricultural or grazing lessees to show that they paid former lessees the 
value of their improvements before DNRC would issue leases.185  
Montrust argued this statute violated the fiduciary duty of loyalty by 
                                                 
177. Id. at 806; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-208.  This did not apply to the 
relevant statute on its face, which the Court determined to be constitutional.  
178. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
808; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-5-211. 
179. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
808. 
180. Id. 
181. Id.  
182. Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 77-6-304.  
183. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
809 (citing Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458, 468 (1967)). 
184. Id. 
185. Id.; MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-6-305.  
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delaying the leasing of state trust lands for the benefit of someone other 
than the trust’s beneficiaries.186  The State conceded that delay in leasing 
may occur but argued that such provisions were part of the Board of 
Land Commissioners’ large discretionary power over trust lands, and 
was necessary to eliminate needless complications in determining the 
value of improvements.187  The Court acknowledged the Board’s large 
discretionary power, but stated “this discretion is not unlimited but must 
conform to the requirements of the trust.”188  The Court determined that 
allowing state trust lands to stand idle indefinitely while former and new 
lessees determine the value of improvements was “inconsistent with the 
trust’s mandate that full market value be obtained for school trust lands,” 
and thus unconstitutional.189  
Upon review of the Court’s determination and analysis relating 
to each statute involved, it is safe to state that the Montana Supreme 
Court will strictly interpret the State’s trust mandate.  The next case in 
the Montrust series, Montanans for the Responsible Use of the School 
Trust v. Darkenwald (“Montrust II”), further clarified the boundaries of 
Montana’s trust mandate and recognized the State Board of Land 
Commissioners’ large amount of discretion in carrying out the terms of 
the trust.190  
 
2. Montrust II – Clarifying The Board of Land Commissioners’ 
Discretion 
Montrust II involved an allegation by Montrust that the Board of 
Land Commissioners breached its trust duties under the Montana 
Constitution and Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act by commingling the 
interest earned on certain school trust assets into the State’s General 
Fund without earmarking or accounting for it.191  Montrust also alleged 
the State’s sale of a 30-year future stream of mineral royalties from 
school trust land in exchange for an immediate cash infusion violated the 
                                                 
186. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
810. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. (citing Toomey v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 81 P.2d 407, 414 
(1938); State ex rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 809, 811 (1966)). 
189. Id.  
190. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. 
Darkenwald, 119 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2005).  
191. Id. at 30–33. 
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State’s trust duties.192  The district court ruled in favor of the State 
finding no violations of the State’s trust duties.193  The Montana Supreme 
Court affirmed.194 
In affirming the district court, the Court began by reaffirming, 
rather than fully restating, the State’s trust duties as described in 
Montrust I.195  The Court next reviewed Montrust’s contention regarding 
the commingling of funds.196  It stated that, in accordance with general 
trust law, the State’s duty as a trustee required “it to be able to prove that 
the information in the accounting is sufficiently accurate and complete to 
enable the beneficiaries to protect and defend the equitable or beneficial 
amount.”197  The Court determined that the State had met this burden 
because it had accounted for the exact amount of interest and bonuses 
deposited into the General Fund and the amount of the legislative 
appropriation from the General Fund to public schools, which far 
exceeded any interest or bonuses derived from the trust corpus.198  
Montrust also failed to allege any particular accounting practice 
depriving public schools of their distributable income or that the State 
somehow diverted income away from public schools to non-trust 
purposes.199  As a result, the Court determined that Montrust failed to 
prove any financial harm or breach of trust.200  The Court further 
determined that, under such circumstances, the commingling of funds did 
not constitute a breach of trust per se simply by virtue of the trust’s 
existence.201  
The Court next reviewed a State statute allowing the State to sell 
a thirty-year future stream of mineral royalties from school trust land in 
exchange for an immediate cash infusion.202  Montrust argued that the 
                                                 
192. Id.  The general fund is the common fund into which the State 
deposits all revenues unless the Legislature specifically designates that revenues be 
deposited into a different account.  Id. at 31.  
193. Id. at 33.  
194. Id. at 41.  
195. Id. at 33.  
196. Id. at 33–35.  
197. Id. at 34.  
198. Id. at 34–35. 
199. Id.  
200. Id.  
201. Id. at 35.  
202. Id. at 35–41.  The statute authorized DNRC to borrow up to $75 
million from the coal trust severance tax permanent fund for thirty years to buy 
mineral production royalties owned by the school trust to enhance the short-term 
distributable revenue from the permanent fund for the benefit of public schools.  Id. 
at 31.  The State deposits the loan amount into the permanent fund to increase the 
amount of distributed revenue to beneficiaries and then dedicates the future stream 
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future stream of mineral royalties should be viewed as a sale of the 
school trust lands that cannot be disposed of pursuant to Montana’s 
Constitution and Section 11 of Montana’s Omnibus Enabling Act.203  
The Montana Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the State did not 
dispose of any permanent interest in land, “rather, [the State] has 
exercised its discretion to enter into a loan agreement to exploit mineral 
production—an agreement for which it received full market value.”204  
The Court held that the statute itself did not facially violate the trust 
because nothing in the plain language abrogated the trust’s mandate to 
obtain full market value for school trust lands.205  The Court further held 
that the State’s method of determining full market value was proper and 
did not breach the State’s trust duty.206   
Next, Montrust alleged the State violated Section 11 of the 
Omnibus Enabling Act when it failed to perform independent appraisals 
to determine full market value of the future stream of mineral 
royalties.207  Here, the Court determined that the method of establishing 
value was not a breach of trust because the Board had the power to 
determine the method by which to ascertain full market value.208  The 
Court acknowledged the Board’s duty to ensure the trust receives full 
market value from the sale or disposal of any interest or estate in school 
trust land, but stated that “[o]n this matter we will not substitute our 
opinion for the Land Board’s opinion and we will not control the 
discretion of the board unless it appears that the action of the board is 
                                                                                                             
of mineral royalties to servicing the loan over a thirty-year period.  Id. at 36.  The 
State also distributes any surplus cash flow to the trust beneficiaries.  Id.  Once the 
state repays the loan, it would again deposit future royalties directly into the 
permanent fund.  Id.  
203. Id. at 36.  
204. Id. (citing Hughes v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 353 P.2d 331, 336  
(Mont. 1960) (upholding a statute authorizing the Land Board to lease state lands for 
underground storage of natural gas); Rist v. Toole Cnty., 159 P.2d 340, 342 (Mont. 
1945) (Royalty means a share of the produce or profit paid to the owner of property, 
which is different from a share or interest in the property itself.); Toomey v. State 
Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 81 P.2d 407, 414 (1938) (Land Board’s authority to enter into 
a pooling agreement with private parties is well within the Board’s discretion as it 
constitutes one of the types of arrangements whereby oil and gas possibilities may be 
exploited pursuant to § 11 of the Omnibus Enabling Act.)).  
205. Darkenwald, 119 P.3d at 37.  
206. Id. at 37–38. 
207. Id. at 38.  
208. Id. (citing Hughes, 353 P.2d at 338–39 (internal quotations omitted) 
(upholding the State’s determination of full market value using a computation of the 
present value of the royalty interest of the State based upon the number of cubic feet 
of recoverable gas remaining in the ground)). 
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arbitrarily and, in effect, fraudulent.”209  The Court, however, cautioned 
the State that an independent appraisal represents the most reliable 
method of ensuring that the trust receives full market value.210 The Court 
also noted that it would not hesitate to overturn a transaction in which the 
State did not receive full market value.211 
Montrust further alleged that the distribution of the future stream 
of mineral royalties improperly favored present beneficiaries to the 
detriment of future beneficiaries in violation of the State’s trust duties.212  
The Court distinguished Montrust I, because the State in Montrust I had 
breached its duty of undivided loyalty by providing trust assets to third-
parties for less than full market value.213  The Court held that the 
“trustees enjoy far broader discretion in this context than the limited 
discretion afforded in the breach of duty of undivided loyalty situation 
described in Montrust I.”214  The Court determined that the Land Board 
considered its duty to current and future beneficiaries and concluded that 
the particular distribution helped both.215  It stated, “Montrust’s 
disagreement with the Land Board over its policy of shifting some 
income from long-term to short-term beneficiaries provides an 
insufficient basis upon which to overturn its decision, particularly where 
the transaction does not deplete the permanent fund, but only causes it to 
grow at a slower rate.”216  In short, the Court determined that the State 
did not violate its trust duties through its sale of the future stream of 
mineral royalties.217   
The next case in the Montrust series, Montrust III, alleged 
violations of the State’s fiduciary duties relating to its cabin site leasing 
program.  The parties reached a settlement, however, and therefore the 
                                                 
209. Id. at 38 (internal quotation omitted). 
210. Id. at 34 
211. Id. at 38. 
212. Id. at 39.  
213. Id.  
214. Id. (citing State ex rel. Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808 (1966) 
(accepting “the Land Board’s discretionary authority to accept lease terms less than 
the highest bid in order to effectuate sustained yield concepts and ensure land-term 
strength of the trust corpus”).  The Court also noted that other jurisdictions have 
upheld regulations that, in effect, constrained the ability of present beneficiaries 
from exploiting resources on school trust lands, which in effect favored future 
beneficiaries.  Id. (citing Colo. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs v. Colo. Mined Land 
Reclamation Bd., 809 P.2d 974, 985 (Colo. 1991); Nat’l Parks and Conservation 
Assoc. v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 923 (Utah 1993)). 
215. Id. at 40–41. 
216. Id. at 41.  
217. Id.  
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case did not result in a court decision.  Despite the lack of a final court 
decision, the case remains relevant to examining the State’s trust 
responsibilities.  
 
3. Montrust III – Settlement Based on Established Full Market Value 
Principles  
In 2012, Montrust initiated a third lawsuit against the State, 
referred to as Montrust III.218  In Montrust III, Montrust alleged that a 
2011 statute, and its implementing administrative rules, violated the 
State’s fiduciary, trust, and Constitutional duties, because it set certain 
fee calculation methods and directed DNRC to conduct a bidding process 
for currently vacant cabin site lots with an initial minimum bid of 2% of 
the appraised value of the lot.  Montrust argued this failed to secure for 
the trust a full market value rate of return.219  The parties settled the 
litigation, agreeing to a permanent injunction of the challenged statute 
and associated rules.220  Thus, Montrust III did not directly create new 
case law relating to Montana’s trust principles.  The settlement 
demonstrates, however, that the State understands its obligation to obtain 
full market value for leases.  
The settlement agreement required the State to administer cabin 
site lease rates under its terms and administrative rules created to 
implement those terms.  Specifically, under the terms of the settlement 
the State agreed to offer all vacant cabin site leases for competitive bid at 
a minimum rate of 6.5% of the appraised value of the lot, which rate 
could be reduced to 5% if bids were not received within sixty days.221  In 
a neighborhood where vacancy rates are higher than 30%, DNRC is 
allowed to offer the leases at less than 5%, but not less than 3.5% of the 
apprised land value or $800.00 per year, whichever is higher.222  The 
State also must also renew all existing leases at a rate of no less than 5% 
of the appraised land value or $800.00, whichever is greater.223  In 
                                                 
218. See Decision and Final Judgment On Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. 
Montana (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015) (No. 2012-39); see also Montrust 
III Settlement Agreement, Frequently Asked Questions, DNRC (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/trust/docs/real-estate-management/Cabin%20Site%20 
Lease%20-%20Information%20Docs/miii-faq-for-mailing-november-9-2015.pdf.  
219. Decision and Final Judgment On Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supra note 218, at 5–6. 
220. Id. at 7.  
221. Id. at 8. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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addition, every two years the Land Board must review the data from all 
cabin site leases and complete a formal review by an economist to 
consider whether to revise the rates.224  Finally, the Land Board 
committed “to setting the rental rates for cabin site leases so as [to] 
capture for the trust beneficiaries the full market value of such leases in 
order to maximize the cumulative long-term revenue from cabin sites 
without creating vacancy rates that are detrimental to the best financial 
interest of the trust beneficiaries, as required by the Montana 
Constitution and Enabling Act.”225  In sum, the Montrust series of cases 
brought a new focus to trust land management in Montana.  These cases 
also served to clarify key principles of trust land management.  
 
D. Montana Supreme Court Further Refines Key Trust Principles 
In 2003, Friends of the Wild Swan, an environmental advocacy 
organization, challenged the Board of Land Commissioners’ 
methodology in evaluating timber sale transactions, claiming the Board 
was required under its powers and duties as a trustee to make a harvest-
specific accounting of State timber sales.226  Specifically, Friends of the 
Wild Swan argued that without the harvest-specific accounting, the 
Board’s requirement pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-202, 
to “secure the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to 
the state” was meaningless.227  The Board had approved the timber sale 
at issue in the summer of 2003 without a harvest-level accounting 
because it specifically evaluated costs and benefits at the programmatic, 
or year-end, level only.228  
The Montana Supreme Court held that the harvest-level 
accounting of proposed timber sales was not required by law.229  The 
Court noted the additional information may be advantageous and would 
undoubtedly help the Board in its evaluation of the timber sales.230 The 
question was not whether such accounting would be preferable or 
desirable, but whether it was required by law.231  The Court examined the 
Board’s broad, but not unlimited, discretion over the administration of 
                                                 
224. Id. at 9.  
225. Id.  In addition, attorney’s fees were awarded to both Montrust and 
the Board of Regents of Higher Education.  Id.  
226. Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep’t. of Natural Res. & Conservation, 
127 P.3d 394, 396 (Mont. 2005). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 400. 
230. Id. at 399. 
231. Id. at 400. 
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school trust lands.232  The Court stated, “it is clear that the Board’s 
obligation as trustee is a complex one, that the obligation is governed by 
constitutional and statutory provisions which grant authority to the Board 
over the trust, and that these provisions grant ‘large’ or ‘considerable’ 
discretion to the Board in the performance of its duties.”233  In addition, 
the Court stated that the Board’s status as a state agency also entitled it to 
respectful consideration of its long and continued course of consistent 
interpretation, which could only be overcome by “compelling 
indications.”234  The Court determined no evidence existed that the Board 
could not secure the largest measure of benefit without the harvest-level 
accounting of timber sales.235  Given the discretion afforded to the Board 
in the administration of the trust and as a state agency, the Court could 
not conclude that the harvest-specific accounting requirement was 
required by Montana Code Annotated § 77-1-202.236   
 
E. Brief Summary of Montana’s Trust Mandate and Key Principles 
 After over a century of case law establishing, interpreting, and 
refining Montana’s constitutional trust mandate, three key principles 
have emerged.  The first is that the State, as a trustee, has a fiduciary 
duty to the beneficiaries of the trust.  The trust must be administered to 
secure the largest measure of legitimate and reasonable advantage to the 
State while at the same time providing for the long-term financial 
support of education.237  In doing so, the State must receive full market 
value for the disposition of any estate or interest in school trust lands.238  
Specifically, according to a Montana Attorney General Opinion, the 
State must “actually compensate its school trust in money” for the full 
market value of its lands or interest therein.239  
                                                 
232. Id. at 397. 
233. Id.  
234. Id.  
235. Id. at 399. 
236. Id.   
237. MONT. CODE. ANN. § 77-1-202 (2015); State ex rel. Gravely v. 
Stewart, 137 P. 854, 855 (Mont. 1913) (internal citations omitted); see also Rider v. 
Cooney, 23 P.2d 261, 265–66 (Mont. 1933); Montanans for the Responsible Use of 
the Sch. Trust v. State ex rel. Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 989 P.2d 800, 803 (Mont 1999).  
238. Omnibus Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, § 11, 25 Stat. 676, 679–80; 
Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 805–06.  
239. See Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 2, 36 Op. Att’y Gen. 287 (1976); see also 
Woodgerd & McCarthy, supra note 108, at 125–26 (“In 1976, Montana Attorney 
General Robert Woodahl, at the request of the Acting Commissioner of State Lands, 
issued an opinion concerning the Montana Natural Areas Act of 1974. The opinion 
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 The second key principle is that the State, as a trustee, owes a 
duty of undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries.240 This duty of 
undivided loyalty “is jealously insisted on by the courts which require a 
standard with a ‘punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.’”241  Indeed, 
“[a] trustee must act with the utmost good faith toward the beneficiary, 
and may not act in his own interest, or in the interest of a third 
person.”242  In addition, the State may not advantage one beneficiary over 
another, but must deal impartially with them.243 
 And finally, in carrying out its role as trust administrator, the 
Board is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions that grant it 
considerable discretion in the performance of its duties.244  A court will 
not control this discretion unless it is arbitrary and, in effect, 
fraudulent.245  The Board’s discretion is limited by the requirements of 
the trust including Montana’s constitutional requirement that the State 
obtain full market value for the disposition of any estate or interest in 
school trust land.246  Yet, the Board may have the discretion to accept 
less than the highest bid for an interest in land to effectuate sustained 
                                                                                                             
stated: So that the state will not commit a breach of trust under the Omnibus 
Enabling Act and Montana Constitution, the state must actually compensate its 
school trust in money for the full appraised value of any school trust lands 
designated as or exchanged for natural areas pursuant to the Montana Natural Areas 
Act of 1974. Such compensation can only be avoided by securing the consent of 
Congress.”). 
240. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
808–10.  
241. Id.  
242. Id. at 808 (citing Wild W. Motors, Inc. v. Lingle, 728 P.2d 412, 
415–16 (Mont. 1986)).  
243. See Montanans for Responsible Sch. Trust v. State, No. 97-134, 
1998 Mont. Dist. Lexis 730, at *7 (Apr. 1, 1998) (“[T]he State may not provide 
favoritism to some beneficiaries if such conduct does not benefit the trust as a 
whole.”).  
244. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust v. 
Darkenwald, 119 P.3d 27, 36 (Mont. 2005); Friends of the Wild Swan v. Dep’t. of 
Natural Res. & Conservation, 127 P.3d 394, 397 (Mont. 2005); State ex rel. 
Thompson v. Babcock, 409 P.2d 808, 811 (1966) (“The State Board of Land 
Commissioners has considerable discretionary power . . . . If the ‘largest measure of 
legitimate and reasonable advantage’ from the use of state lands is to accrue to the 
state, then the State Land Board must, necessarily, have a large discretionary 
power,” which is “inherent in the general and discretionary powers conferred by the 
constitution, and necessary for the proper discharge of its duties.”).  
245. Darkenwald, 119 P.3d at 38.  
246. Montanans for the Responsible Use of the Sch. Trust, 989 P.2d at 
810; Babcock, 409 P.2d at 811; Toomey v. State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 81 P.2d 407, 
414 (1938). 
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yield concepts and ensure the long-term strength of the permanent 
fund.247    
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Montana’s state school trust lands have a unique history and 
legal framework. Montana’s courts interpret Montana’s Omnibus 
Enabling Act, Constitution, and statutory framework to define the trust 
relationship and principles under which state school trust lands are 
managed.  The management of school trust lands, as well as the income 
derived from such lands is, and will remain, immensely important to 
Montana.   
 
                                                 
247. See Babcock, 409 P.2d at 812; see also In re Powder River Drainage 
Area, 702 P.2d 948, 952 (Mont. 1985). 
